Kerala slow burn, Bengal high stakes: BJP’s dual test

As electoral temperatures rise across key states, one constant remains quite strikingly: the opposition’s inability—or unwillingness—to recalibrate their political strategy. Alliances are stitched together with convenience rather than coherence, rhetoric often substitutes for introspection, and ideological contradictions are brushed aside in the urgency to counter the ruling dispensation. Nowhere is this more visible than in the trajectory of the Congress party.

Despite a prolonged phase of electoral setbacks, Congress appears yet to absorb the lessons of defeat. The tone and tenor of its public articulation often betray certain disconnect. A recent remark by senior Congress spokesperson Pawan Khera—that the party could win elections if given control of institutions like the ED, CBI, the Election Commission, and even a national media platform—raises troubling questions. Was this rhetorical flourish, or an inadvertent admission?

In a democracy, electoral victory hinges on public trust, organisational strength, and clarity of vision—not control over institutions. Statements of this nature risk reinforcing the ruling party’s long-standing allegation that institutions were once misused for political ends. More importantly, they suggest a deeper malaise: a lack of confidence in the party’s own ability to connect with voters.

This crisis of credibility extends beyond rhetoric into conduct. On matters of national importance—particularly those involving geopolitical sensitivities—the opposition’s approach has often appeared fragmented. During deliberations on the evolving West Asian crisis, the absence of Rahul Gandhi from a key all-party meeting drew attention. While the Congress cited personal reasons, reports suggested that the decision was perhaps premeditated. Ironically, leaders like Mamata Banerjee chose to boycott the meeting altogether.

Such gestures, intended perhaps as political signalling, risk being interpreted as indifference to national consensus-building at a time of global uncertainty. India’s diplomatic posture—balancing ties with Iran, Israel, and the United States—has been a delicate exercise. Yet, sections of the opposition have been quick to dismiss official briefings and question the government’s handling of the crisis, often without acknowledging the complexities involved.

Criticism is the lifeblood of democracy, but it must be anchored in responsibility. When opposition narratives appear to align more with ideological positioning or perceived vote bank sensitivities than with national interest, they risk eroding their own credibility. Expressions of selective empathy in international matters, or attempts to draw unfavourable comparisons with countries like Pakistan, do little to strengthen their case.

This broader pattern points to a fundamental challenge: the opposition’s struggle to strike a balance between political contestation and constructive engagement. Electoral politics cannot be reduced to perpetual confrontation; it must also accommodate moments of consensus, especially on issues of national security and foreign policy.

Against this backdrop, the electoral battlegrounds of Kerala and West Bengal present two contrasting theatres for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), illustrating different phases of its political expansion.

In the former, BJP remains a peripheral yet persistent force. The state’s political landscape continues to be dominated by the bipolar contest between the Left Democratic Front (LDF), led by Pinarayi Vijayan, and the Congress-led United Democratic Front (UDF). The BJP’s electoral performance reflects this structural constraint. It failed to secure a single seat in the 2021 Assembly elections, and its vote share—hovering around 14–15 per cent in subsequent local body polls—indicates incremental, but not transformative, growth.

Yet, beneath these numbers lies a subtler shift. The BJP’s capture of the Thiruvananthapuram Corporation marked a symbolic breakthrough, demonstrating its potential in urban constituencies. Its outreach to Christian communities and backward Hindu groups suggests a long-term strategy aimed at social reconfiguration rather than immediate electoral dividends.

Importantly, the BJP has succeeded in inserting itself into Kerala’s political discourse. Even as a third force, it compels both the LDF and UDF to respond to its narrative, signalling a gradual, if limited, expansion of influence. However, formidable barriers remain: consolidated minority voting patterns, the entrenched LDF–UDF binary, and a political culture wary of overt religious polarisation. Even within the BJP, expectations are tempered—crossing into double-digit seats would be seen as a significant milestone.

If Kerala represents a slow and steady climb, West Bengal is a high-stakes contest. Here, the BJP has already altered the political equilibrium. From a marginal presence a decade ago, it emerged as the principal challenger in 2021, securing 77 seats and over 38 per cent vote share against the ruling Trinamool Congress (TMC), led by Mamata Banerjee.

The 2026 election is not about relevance for the BJP—it is about conversion. Can it translate its substantial vote base into power?

Ground assessments suggest a more calibrated strategy this time. The party has moved beyond a predominantly centralised campaign to focus on booth-level organisation, local grievances, and sustained cadre mobilisation. Issues such as corruption, governance deficits, and welfare delivery are being foregrounded alongside identity-driven narratives like citizenship and minority appeasement.

Key regions offer potential gains: North Bengal, border districts, tribal belts like Jangalmahal, and segments of urban and semi-urban voters. However, significant challenges persist. Minority-dominated constituencies remain largely resistant, and rural southern Bengal continues to be a TMC stronghold, bolstered by effective welfare schemes and deep organisational networks.

Moreover, Banerjee’s political resilience cannot be underestimated. Despite facing anti-incumbency, she retains strong grassroot connect. The TMC’s booth-level machinery remains formidable, often outmatching the BJP’s organisational depth in crucial constituencies. Bengali sub-national identity—effectively mobilised by the TMC—adds another layer of complexity to the BJP’s challenge.

What is also evident is that political contestation in Bengal has moved beyond periodic elections into continuous mobilisation. Street-level confrontations, even during religious events, indicate a deeply polarised environment where politics permeates everyday life.

Taken together, Kerala and West Bengal illustrate two distinct trajectories. In Kerala, the BJP is engaged in long-term groundwork, seeking to expand its social base and electoral footprint. Immediate power remains elusive, but incremental gains could reshape future contests.

In West Bengal, however, the battle is immediate and intense. The BJP is well-positioned to make significant inroads and narrow the gap with the TMC, but converting momentum into a decisive victory it must overcome structural and demographic constraints.

For the opposition, these elections present not just a political challenge but an existential one. Without a coherent strategy, credible leadership, and a narrative that resonates beyond tactical alliances, it risks ceding further ground. Elections are not merely about defeating an opponent; they are about convincing the electorate that one offers a better alternative.

Until that shift occurs, the opposition’s struggle may continue—not just against the BJP, but against its own contradictions.

(The author is former Chief Editor of The Hans India)